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Introduction
The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between the federal funds rate and
the audit fees paid by financial institutions. A lower federal funds rate is likely to inject
countervailing pressures into audit fee negotiations; (1) downward pressure stemming from
reduced profit margins, and (2) upward pressure from increased audit risk. With respect to (1),
the extant literature suggests reduced economic performance creates downward fee pressure (Beck
and Mauldin 2014), and a lower federal funds rate decreases the profitability of financial
institutions. Specifically, when the federal funds rate is lower, a bank’s net interest margin is
reduced, and there is less demand for loans (Borio, Gambacorta, and Hofmann, 2017). With
respect to (2), the audit risk model states that higher levels of risk require additional audit effort.
Assuming the auditor shares these costs with the client, the client will pay higher fees. Prior
literature finds reduced profitability is one condition that increases audit risk and results in higher
fees (Walker and Casterella 2000). Further, prior research suggests that banks are willing to invest
in riskier assets when interest rates are low (Altunbas 2010). These countervailing pressures make
the relation between the federal funds rate and audit fees an empirical question.
The federal funds rate is the rate at which banks can invest their money in U.S Treasuries or
other institutions overnight, in order to meet reserve requirements and generate short-term returns.
Cutting and hiking the fed rate is a tool used by the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed) to conduct
monetary policy. 1 The rate is generally cut during times of economic stress, which promotes more
lending and borrowing. As the cost of capital is reduced and the economy begins to strengthen,
consumers spend more money on goods and services. However, excessive rate cuts can

1

Although changing the short-term rate can be considered both a “tool” for monetary policy and a “form” of monetary policy, I
refer to it as a tool.

overstimulate the economy and lead to inflation. To keep economic growth at sustainable levels,
the Fed can raise rates. This reduces inflation, and increases the value of the U.S. dollar.
The fees auditors charge clients are primarily a function of the amount of work performed by
the auditor, and the amount of work performed increases with the auditor’s assessment of risk
(Turpen 1995). While audit fees are primarily a function of risk, Beck and Mauldin (2014) suggest
that during periods of economic stress, this relation weakens. Audit fees are one of the most
commonly negotiated audit items, and clients can bargain for lower fees. During a period of
economic stress, a client is especially motivated to negotiate lower audit fees as a cost-cutting
measure. Auditors are likely to accept negotiations under certain circumstances to maintain
relationships, retain clients, and earn future economic rents (Beck and Mauldin 2014).
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the relationship between the
federal funds rate and audit fees. Consequently, this study makes several contributions to extant
literature. First, it contributes to a growing stream of literature focused on interest rates and bank
profitability (Altunbas, 2010; Bikker and Vervliet, 2018; Borio et al., 2017). My results suggest
interest rates and profitability effect a party other than the bank, the bank’s auditor. Second, I
contribute to a stream of literature that examines the effects of economic performance on audit fee
negotiations. While prior studies find macro-level economic stress reduces audit fees, I find a less
pervasive form of economic stress does not. Finally, this study introduces a new variable that has
a significant impact on audit fees, contributing to the existing fee literature (DeFond and Zhang,
2014).

Background and Hypothesis
The Federal Funds Rate
The Fed is defined as a monopolistic entity seeking to affect nonfinancial economic activity
such as employment and inflation (Friedman 2000). The Fed is responsible for supervising the
nation’s largest banks, providing financial services to the U.S. Government, and implementing
monetary policy. The Federal Reserve Act mandates that the Fed conduct monetary policy “so as
to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term
interest rates” (Washington: Board of Governors 2016, p. 1). Decisions about monetary policy are
made by the Fed’s Open Market Committee (FOMC), which is a committee comprised of the Fed
Board of Governors, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and 4 (out of 11) of
the remaining reserve presidents (Reserve 2021). The FOMC meets 8 times per year and discusses
both financial and non-financial economic conditions including employment, inflation, GDP, and
interest rates.
A crucial job of the FOMC is setting the target federal funds rate. The target rate, as
opposed to the effective rate, is the Fed’s desired interest rate level, defined as a range. The Fed
implements monetary policy with the goal of ensuring the effective rate falls within the target
range. The effective federal funds rate (EFFR) is “the interest rate at which depository institutions
lend reserve balances to other depository institutions overnight” (Federal Reserve, 2021, p. 1). It
is important to understand that the EFFR is a short-term rate, therefore it only directly affects
reserves lent from bank to bank overnight. However, since the 2008 financial crisis, the Fed has
made an effort to buy and sell more long-term treasury assets in order to put pressure on long-term
rates (Reserve 2021).

The Federal Reserve Banks are in charge of implementing monetary policy and have a
number1 of tools, or instruments, they use to ensure effective rates stay within the target range
(Reserve 2021). The most common instrument utilized by the Fed to raise or lower short-term rates
is Open Market Operations (OMO). The U.S. Federal Reserve (2021) describes Open Market
Operations as “the purchase and sale of securities in the open market by a central bank”. It is
important to distinguish Open Market Operations from Quantitative Easing (QE), as they both
involve buying and selling treasury assets, but on different ends of the yield curve. OMO involves
only short-term assets, while Quantitative Easing targets longer maturity assets that will have a
more direct effect on the corresponding rates. During expansionary monetary policy, the trading
desk at a central bank purchases Treasury securities from financial institutions that hold reserves
at the Fed (Koenig 2004). Money is placed into their reserve accounts, increasing the amount of
capital banks can lend to their customers (corporations and individuals). With larger reserve pools,
banks are able to lend money at a lower interest rate.

Interest Rates and Bank Profitability
Many studies in extant literature have examined the relationship between sovereign monetary
policy and bank profitability, but only few have focused on interest rates specifically (Borio et al.,
2017). Borio et al. (2017) discusses various determinants of bank profitability, and how interest
rates can be expected to affect them. One profitability determinant is net interest income. This is
the income generated from banks’ lending money to individuals and organizations and charging
interest in return. As Borio et al. (2017) points out, there are two mechanisms that define the
relationship between the effective federal funds rate and net interest income: the retail deposits
endowment effect and the quantity effect.

The retail deposits endowment effect refers to the relation between the effective federal funds rate
and the net interest earned on deposits. Typically, the interest paid from banks to customers for
bank deposits is marked down from market rates. The difference between these two rates is known
as the net interest margin (NIM). During periods of high interest rates, this margin expands, and
banks turn a higher profit. Conversely, bank deposit rates cannot dip below zero; therefore, as
market rates drop, the markdown to market for bank deposits must be compressed (Borio et al.
2017). This reduces NIM and banks lose out on profit. The quantity effect refers to the relation
between the effective federal funds rate and loan demand. There is an erosion of profitability as
interest rates increase due to the elasticity of loan demand (Borio et al. 2017). In simple terms, the
demand for bank loans is more responsive to changes in interest rates than deposits, therefore
higher rates could decrease net interest margin to a degree. However, the magnitude of the quantity
effect is not sufficient to overcome the retail deposits endowment effect.
Wheelock (2016) explains another perspective on the relationship between interest rates
and NIM. Banks typically tend to “lend long and borrow short” (Wheelock, 2016, p.1), meaning
the maturities for outstanding loans in a bank’s portfolio are longer than the maturities of deposits
funding the bank’s activities (their cost of funding). This would mean that as interest rates fall,
funding costs would fall much faster, therefore increasing net interest margin in the short term
(Wheelock 2016). This, however, would begin to level out over time as longer-maturity loans are
issued at the lower rate. This may suggest that as long as interest rates remain low for a long period
of time, the retail endowment effect will ensue and NIM will be squeezed.

Audit Risk and Fee Pressure
While a lower effective federal funds rate can affect all types of businesses, the rate has a
particularly strong relationship with bank profitability. Specifically, as when the EFFR is lower,
banks earn lower profits. Prior audit fee literature suggests poor firm performance results in
downward fee pressure. When firms are less profitable managers take actions to cut costs and these
actions include negotiating lower fees. Ettredge et al. (2014) provide evidence of downward fee
pressure during the most recent economic recession. Similarly, Christensen et al. (2014) find that
during the same recession, the correlation between risk and fees became materially weaker. This
suggests the lower levels of bank profitability associated reductions in the effective federal funds
rate will inject downward pressure into audit fee negotiations.
Alternatively, a lower effective federal funds rate and reduced bank profitability may result in
higher audit fees. Audit fees are primarily driven by auditor effort, and auditor effort is driven
primarily by risk (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). The extant literature suggests during periods of low
interest rates banks are likely to be riskier clients for two reasons. First, banks make riskier
decisions when profits are lower (Bikker and Vervliet, 2018; Altunbas, 2010). Risk-taking for
banks can happen through two channels: income diversification, and/or high yield investing. With
income diversification, institutions will find new ways to make money outside of their core
business model. With high yield investing, banks will find riskier, but more profitable assets to
invest in rather than Treasuries or other bank reserves. In response to low interest rates banks
expand in areas outside their core markets, extend their range of services, shift investment
strategies and establish new lines of business (Bikker and Vervliet, 2018). Second, firms with
lower levels of profitability have additional incentives to manage earnings and the auditing
standards identify lower profitability as a factor the auditor must consider to be a condition

indicative of higher risk. Assuming either of these two factors causes the auditor to increase their
risk assessment, lower levels of profitability will inject upward pressure into audit fee negotiations.

Hypothesis
While the extant literature suggests audit fees are discounted when a client experiences
economic stress, these studies focus primarily on macro-level economic stress, and represent a
subset of the extant literature (Beck and Mauldin, 2014; Christensen et al, 2014). Studies that
examine the relation between less pervasive forms of economic stress and audit fees provide
consistent evidence of an inverse relation between profitability and audit fees (e.g. Walker and
Casterella, 2000; Hay, Knechel, and Wong, 2006; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Because a lower
effective federal funds rate is a condition that will only impact a subset of the auditor’s clients, I
expect an inverse relation between the federal funds rate and audit fees. I state my hypothesis in
its alternative form:

H1: Firm-years where the effective federal funds rate is low in more months will be associated
with higher levels of audit fees.

Methodology
Sample Selection
The sample selection process starts with all firms for which fee data is available on the
Audit Analytics database. I drop observations missing data on Compustat (106,041 observations)
and outside the financial section (96,529 observations). I then drop observations missing the data

necessary for calculating the variables of interest (18,376 observations). This selection process
yields a final sample of 3,332 observations.
Table 1
Sample Selection
Observations with audit fee data for 2000-2020 on Audit Analytics
Less:
Companies not available on Compustat
Companies not in the financial sector (SIC Codes 6000-6999)
Companies without the data necessary to calculate the control variables

224,278
(106,041)
(96,529)
(18,376)

Final Sample

3,332

Regression Model
Following Francis et al. (2005) and Fung et al. (2012), I estimate the following regression
model to test my hypothesis:

𝐿𝐴𝐹 = 𝛽! + 𝛽" (𝐿𝑂𝑊 𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑊) + 𝛽# 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁 + 𝛽$ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐 + 𝛽% 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 +
𝛽& 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽' 𝐿𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽( 𝑆𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽) 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽* 𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾 + 𝛽"! 𝐷𝐸 + 𝛽"" 𝑅𝑂𝐼 +
𝛽"# 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 + 𝛽"$ 𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝛽"% 𝑌𝐸 + 𝛽"& 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽"' 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀,
where:
LOW = an indicator coded 1 if the effective federal funds rate was below 2% for at least
nine of 12 months in the year, and 0 otherwise;
MONTHS_LOW = the number of months in a year the effective federal funds rate was
below two percent;
LAF = natural log of audit fees (in thousands of dollars);
BIGN = indicator coded 1if the auditor is in the big 4, and 0 otherwise;
Spec = indicator variable coded 1 for auditors that are city industry leaders, and 0

otherwise;
Scale = percentile rank of the city-industry number of audit clients (NClients) for each
Big N audit firm (variable values range from 0.01 to 1);
CITYSIZE = natural log of aggregate audit fees for all firms audited by the company’s
auditor for each city;
LTA = natural log of total assets (in millions of dollars);
LSEG = natural log of the number of unique business segments;
CATA = ratio of current assets to total assets;
QUICK = ratio of current assets (excluding inventories) to current liabilities;
DE = ratio of long-term debt to total assets;
ROI = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets;
FOREIGN = proportion of total sales from foreign operations;
OPINION = indicator variable coded 1 for modified audit report, and 0 otherwise;
YE = indicator variable coded 1 for non-December 31 year-end, and 0 otherwise;
LOSS = indicator variable coded 1 if loss in current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise;
Fixedeffects = year indicator variables; and
e = random-error term.

The variables of interest are LOW and MONTHS_LOW. LOW is an indicator variable
coded 1 if the effective federal funds rate was below 2% for at least nine of 12 months in a year. I
chose 2% because it approximates the average fed funds rate over the past 10 years.
MONTHS_LOW is a continuous measure, defined as the number of months within a year the

effective federal funds rate was below the 2% threshold. The dependent variable, LAF is the
natural log of audit fees in thousands of dollars.
Following Fung et al. (2012), I use control variables that capture other audit fee
determinants. I use variables that control for firm size (LTA), fiscal year-end (YE), audit opinion
(OPINION), and other measures that capture complexity and risk. The complexity and risk
variables include LSEG, FOREIGN, CATA, DE, LOSS, QUICK, and ROI.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all variables. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. The mean for MONTHS_LOW suggests the effective
federal funds rate is below 2% for nine of twelve months in the average year. The binary variable
LOW is coded 1 in 69 percent of firm-years. The value of the dependent variable, LAF, is
consistent with prior research (Fung et al., 2012). The mean (median) audit fee is $1,338,000
($331,000). Descriptive statistics for all control variables are consistent with prior research (Fung
et al., 2012).

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

n

Mean

Median

Q1

Q3

Std. Dev.

AUDIT_FEES

3,332

1,338,880

331,000

76,980

1,288,615

2,839,411

LAF

3,332

12.66

12.71

11.25

14.07

1.84

LOW

3,332

0.69

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.46

MONTHS_LOW

3,332

8.54

12.00

1.00

12.00

5.05

BIGN

3,332

0.57

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.49

SPEC

3,332

0.59

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.49

SCALE

3,332

0.32

0.18

0.18

0.42

0.19

CITYSIZE

3,332

15.62

15.87

13.82

17.63

2.47

LTA

3,332

4.72

5.12

2.70

7.08

3.32

LSEG

3,332

0.55

0.00

0.00

1.10

0.66

CATA

3,332

0.51

0.50

0.24

0.77

0.31

QUICK

3,332

8.19

1.48

0.87

3.04

51.72

DE

3,332

0.20

0.06

0.00

0.25

0.51

ROI

3,332

-1.27

0.03

-0.08

0.10

15.08

FOREIGN

3,332

0.12

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.29

OPINION

3,332

0.16

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.37

LOSS

3,332

0.42

0.00

0.00

1.00

0.49

YE

3,332

0.78

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.41

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample comprising 3,332 firm-year observations. All variable
definitions are provided in Appendix A.

Audit Fees
My hypothesis predicts the effective federal funds rate will be inversely associated with
audit fees for firms in the banking industry. To test this hypothesis, I examine whether LOW and
MONTHS_LOW are positively associated with LAF. In Table 3, I use ordinary least square
regression to examine the relation between these variables. Column (1) reports results from the

estimation of Model (1) using the full sample and shows the coefficient on LOW is positive and
significant (p < 0.01). Column (2) reports results from the estimation of Model (1) using the full
sample and shows the coefficient on MONTHS_LOW is positive and significant (p < 0.01).
The
positive coefficients associated with both variables suggest in firm-years where the
effective federal funds rate is lower are associated with higher fees. In sum, the evidence presented
in Table 3 supports my hypothesis.

TABLE 3
Relation Between Low Interest Rates and Audit Fees
DV = LAF
Variable

(1)
Est.

LOW

0.563

(2)

P-Val
0.00

Sig.

Est.

P-Val

Sig.

***

MONTHS_LOW

0.047

0.00

-0.010

0.92

***

BIGN

-0.010

0.92

SPEC

0.220

0.00

***

0.220

0.00

***

SCALE

-0.948

0.00

***

-0.948

0.00

***

CITYSIZE

0.218

0.00

***

0.218

0.00

***

LTA

0.393

0.00

***

0.393

0.00

***

LSEG

0.230

0.00

***

0.230

0.00

***

CATA

0.446

0.00

***

0.446

0.00

***

-0.002

0.00

***

-0.002

0.00

***

DE

0.119

0.00

***

0.119

0.00

***

ROI

-0.005

0.01

***

-0.005

0.01

***

FOREIGN

0.031

0.73

0.031

0.73

OPINION

0.142

0.07

*

0.142

0.07

*

LOSS

0.115

0.01

**

0.115

0.01

**

YE

0.069

0.34

0.069

0.34

INTERCEPT

6.689

0.00

6.689

0.00

QUICK

***

Year F.E.

Yes

Yes

Robust SE

Yes

Yes

Adj. R2

0.864

0.864

n

3,332

3,332

***

Table 3 presents the results from the estimation of Model (1). The dependent variable is LAF. *,
**, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, using a 2-tailed test
for all variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Year
indicator variables are omitted for brevity. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.

Conclusion
The objective of my research was to examine the role of short-term interest rates in bank
profitability and audit pricing for financial institutions. The literature suggested multiple possible
scenarios, of which indicated both upward and downward fee pressure when rates are low. Audit
fees may be higher for financial institutions when the EFFR is low due to a higher level of risk
taken on by the auditor. This risk could be a function of riskier investing or income
diversification for banks as their net interest income is squeezed. Conversely, audit fees may be
lower for financial institutions when the EFFR is low due to downward fee pressure from fee
negotiation. Lowered interest rates are typically a result of an economic recession or downturn,
therefore low rates would indicate economic instability. In order to maintain client relationships
(their business), audit firms commonly accept negotiation of fees, especially in a weaker
economy. I expected audit fees to be materially higher (inverse relation) during periods of low
interest rates. My basis for this expectation was that the risk for auditors heavily outweighed any
fee negotiation. The results of the simple regression indicated this to be true, however there is
potential that other factors could exist beyond what is outlined in my research.
Being the first to examine the relationship between the EFFR and audit fees, my research
makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, it adds a new perspective to a stream of
literature surrounding financial institutions and profitability; However, my focus is partial to
short-term rates only. Second, my research contributes to a stream of literature surrounding audit
fee negotiations. I specifically explore one sector of the economy, the financial sector, but still
consider the broader idea of fee negation during times of economic stress. Finally, my research
contributes a new factor to the literature, the EFFR, that, in conclusion, has a significant impact
on audit fees.
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